Yes, Mr. Springer did indeed rely on Adam Smith in his arguments before the Court, but the Court rejected his theories. Here’s the report of the case, which includes the arguments made by Springer, which appear immediately after the phrase “Mr. William M. Springer for the plaintiff in error.” The Court wasn’t impressed: “The numerous citations from the writings of foreign political economists, made by the plaintiff in error, are sufficiently answered by Hamilton in his brief, before referred to.” http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/g ... p;page=586
Moreover, Pollock didn't quite overrule Springer. He had two types of income: bond interest and personal earnings. Only a tax on the former would be considered a direct tax under Pollock, not a tax on the latter.
Your entire pathetic argument boils down to two inconsistent premises, neither of which has any legal basis: first, that compensation for work (absent some sort of governmental privilege – you waffle about whether the privilege must be federal or not) cannot be taxed without apportionment. Second, that pay for work is not gain but is rather an exchange of consideration or a quid pro quo. As to your first premise, suffice it to say that no court in the history of the country has ever suggested (much less held) that a tax on pay for work must be apportioned. To the contrary, beginning with Springer’s rejection of such a premise and proceeding to the dicta in Pollock that recognized the validity of such a tax as an excise and on to the adoption of the 16th Amendment (which unambiguously states that no income tax need be apportioned), the courts have uniformly and without exception rejected toe notion that a tax on compensation for work must be apportioned.
So you are reduced to you second premise – that compensation for work isn’t income -- has likewise been consistently rejected. First of all, compensation for work is not to be analyzed in terms of a sale or exchange, simply because the statute says that such compensation is gross income, period, and distinguishes it from the gain from dealings in property. Second, even if it were to be so analyzed, there would still be gain because gain is the difference between what is received and the cost of what was given up (NOT the value of what was given up). Since one has no cost basis in his labor, the entire amount of compensation is income.
Finally, note that if your second premise is correct, then even compensation from a governmentally-privileged activity wouldn’t be subject to the income tax, so that under your “analysis”, even Mr. Earl shouldn’t have been taxed. But he was, wasn’t he?
Wow, so much verbal diarrhea from Weston and so little cogent analysis.
First off, Weston, I note that you failed to cite a single case in which someone avoided paying federal income tax by relying on your idiotic arguments. This isn’t surprising, since there aren’t any – to the contrary, in every single instance where someone has been brain-dead enough to argue that his compensation for work isn’t taxable because of the moronic theories that you espouse, he has lost. Without exception. In many cases he has not only lost but been fined for wasting the court’s time with such frivolous arguments. And no, the courts that have ruled against such morons aren’t part of a massive conspiracy that’s set on ignoring the Supreme Court; they are accurately applying well-settled law instead of the delusions of an uneducated tax denier.
Second, you have demonstrated an amazing inability to read a case and extract the rationale for the court’s decision. Contrary to your delusions, the rationale of the Lucas case did not in any way rest on Mr. Earl’s particular occupation (indeed the SCOTUS decision doesn’t even mention it). Yes, he was an attorney. He was also an employee of the Great Western Power Company, and there is no discussion in any of the opinions of the case as to how much he earned from each of his endeavors. This should come as no surprise, however, since what he did for a living was completely irrelevant to the case, and all of his income was held to be taxable. The rationale for the decision is very simple: as Justice Holmes put it in words that any third grader could understand (but not you, Weston), “There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earn them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.” In other words, the rule is that compensation for work is taxable, and one cannot shift this burden by an anticipatory assignment of the income. There is nothing suggesting that the occupation generating the compensation or the worker’s position in the hierarchy of the employer is relevant. Such considerations are simply your pathetic attempts to distinguish the case, but unfortunately for you, no court in the history of the country has ever deemed such considerations relevant in determining what is taxable. You might as well argue that Earl was taxed because his name began with “E”.
Your “analysis” of the Gerhardt case is equally inane. The rationale of the case was that state employees are taxable on their compensation just the same as employees in the private sector. The Court rejected the argument that there should be a special exemption for the compensation of such employees because of an alleged adverse impact on the performance of state functions. The employees’ compensation wasn’t taxable BECAUSE of their status as state employees – it was taxable DESPITE such status: “The challenged taxes laid under section 22, Revenue Act of 1932, c. 209, 47 Stat. 169, 178, 26 U.S.C.A. 22, are upon the net income of respondents, derived from their employment in common occupations not shown to be different in their methods or duties from those of similar employees in private industry… A nondiscriminatory tax laid on their net income, in common with that of all other members of the community, could by no reasonable probability be considered to preclude the performance of the function which New York and New Jersey have undertaken, or to obstruct it more than like private enterprises are obstructed by our taxing system.”
Incidentally, your note of curiosity about the closing sentence of the case is curious only to someone who’s too dense to notice that it came from a dissenting opinion.
Well I see that rather then making a concerted effort to either concede on specific matters or thoroughly provide counter-points to my well constructed response, you have instead resorted to your usual degenerate name-calling, which is a wonderful indication that I have gotten the best of you, yet again. In other words you realize in your heart-of-hearts that I am an advocate of the truth, reigning in wisdom, and oh so does this infuriate people exactly like yourself. Personally, for me, dragging you down, time and time again, makes me oh so joyous!
So the court in Springer was not impressed you say? Sounds to me more like that court was downright derelict.
Honestly, you should have readily understood that when I referenced Springer I was referring to the contents as was considered by the justices themselves and not the plaintiff in error. Being that the justices did not bother to lend any serious address to those several sources (which are all just as valid advisory research material for the court to consider as both Hamilton and Madison), having instead hastily cited through them all, while providing not one single quote for resolve; thereby, this case renders itself without much significance at all on the matter; as I had prior stated there are many other much more predominant cases to look toward as they do provide serious discussions with concern to the crux of federal income taxation.
Mr. Springer may had very well included the works of Dr. Adam Smith and others within his pleadings and motions (which was commented on by SCOTUS as being sparse as the primary intention of Springer was just to be heard by the justices), however, the justices did not care to lend any resolve on those works, whatsoever. Ergo, it was not that the justices did not thoughtfully consider such works as Dr. Adam Smith and then discounted them, no, what they did do, however, was not even bother considering them at all; to them it might as well been as if such works were not even included for their dutiful consideration in the first place -plainly, the latter circumstance is vastly different then what you are claiming took place within Springer.
Curiously though, the justices in Springer did opt to make light of the matter in apparent support of solely quoting Hamilton (meanwhile rebuking all other just as relevant sources), whom himself had made the poignant distinctions about the various forms of income that I had referred to earlier (as much more was quoted from Hamilton within Pollock), thereby, clearly the justices themselves, held a misunderstanding as to the fundamental concepts of the subject-matter presently held in debate, still however is the fact that Springer’s own premise appears to have been entirely incorrect (although it should be kept in mind that this case is pre-XVI Amendment and moreover it was not until Pollock came along and discovered the astute realization between a source -that is to be taxed only directly- and its income -that is only to be taxed indirectly). Thus, it was just as well, being that the findings of Springer were left impotent by the determination of the watershed Pollock case (also noting that Pollock made referencing Dr. Adam Smith and such others nothing short of predominant).
As to your position on the non-apportioned taxing of a proletariat’s subsistence, this is entirely the wrong question to be asking [as to the opinion of the court]: “The central and controlling question in this case is whether the tax which was levied on the income, gains, and profits of the plaintiff in error, … is a direct tax.” While this posed question neither has a thing to do with the distinct matters that I have been advocating. As the Springer case was not about receiving salary or wages but “income, gains, and profits”; hence, this case is wholly ineffectual to your cause.
To further galvanize this point, in 1865 Springer had reported to him $50,798, which in today’s market that equates to $714,961, respectively, so don’t you dare go and tell me that Springer was simply a menial day-laborer that dabbled in investments on the side (also noting that general laborers around this timeframe averaged somewhere between only 25-60 cents and hour with no other benefits received), otherwise I will have to call you a liar, ops, too late! So sorry, truly.
To furthermore note, the scope of Springer’s argument was unfounded from the start as he had hedged his bet: “That the tax on the income, gains, and profits of the defendant, assessed upon him, as appears by the evidence in this case, was a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States”. This is steeped in utter misunderstanding and is thereby not relevant to my own views on the matter.
The Corrected URL from below is: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/g ... 2&page=586
So far as Pollock is concerned, it is those underlying worthwhile and meaningful tenets thoroughly discussed throughout both this case and in its rehearing, which truly matters. Those principles apply just the same to both the bond interest and personal earnings to which you had written upon (or whatever else for that matter), as such, you cannot on the one hand pick and choose one while excluding the other; such tact is blatantly illogical. The only substantive distinction to be noted between them, however, is that bond interest would entail a gain that was derived from invested capital (or principal) -hence taxable by the income tax, while personal earnings would entail the capital to procure that gain -hence not taxable by the income tax.
What you are doing, whether you realize it or not, is convoluting compensation brought in from engaging in privileged vocations, professions, or other such forms of vastly beneficial entrepreneurship, all having always existed as proper subjects of the excise tax, with that of the common right to earn a livelihood so as to provide a secure shelter, clean water, warm bread, fresh milk and butter, etc. to one’s own family. In the final equation of this all it is the latter means that has always been considered inappropriate by the government to levy taxes upon, regardless if done by direct or indirect taxation, as the government cannot possibly get any more personal nor “direct” than to strip-away a portion of what was the sum-total that a given self-sustaining individual could have ever hoped to achieve through singularly in effort by way of their own ability or hand.
QUOTING: “As to your first premise, suffice it to say that no court in the history of the country has ever suggested (much less held) that a tax on pay for work must be apportioned.”
No, there have been several such cases you’re just too dense to truly appreciate the context of how it was stated, as within Pollock, Bowers, and Eisner for example. To further note, such a mode of tax if it were ever to be imposed (though to date such taxes have only ever been sought upon slaves), would be proper only as a ‘personal tax’, specifically as a ‘capitation tax’, either of which are under the head of direct taxation.
QUOTING: “the 16th Amendment (which unambiguously states that no income tax need be apportioned)”
Actually, no, it more correctly stipulates that ‘incomes’, when having derived from a source, may then be lawfully taxed under the head of uniformity; conveniently though you had left that little part out, heh.
QUOTING: “So you are reduced to you second premise – that compensation for work isn’t income”
Well, quite clearly, you’re not fully understanding what is being asserted, as it is the ‘compensation’, such being above and beyond an individual’s nominal pay or remuneration that is most likely intended to meet the legalities of being ‘gross income’ as it is compensation that is a portioned addition to the source in consideration. In general when compensation results in an additional increase unto one’s standard expectation of pay/remuneration it then likely meets the burden of being lawfully taxable via the federal income tax.
QUOTING: “First of all, compensation for work is not to be analyzed in terms of a sale or exchange, simply because the statute says that such compensation is gross income, period, and distinguishes it from the gain from dealings in property.”
No, no, no, go back and reread 26 U.S.C. Section 61 again and then once you finish doing that reread it yet once more. Now at this point it should become readily clear to you that when you receive compensation from a ‘source’ -meaning something possessing an inherent value or that can be monetarily converted or reverted through an exchange or transfer of ownership- then and only then does it qualify as being ‘gross income’; as this is what Eisner had clarified (paraphrasing) that everyone dismisses that innocuous paragraph (a) at the top and just looks toward all of those fancy numerations for the answer to their question. So stated, in plain language, without first a valid source, cannot it provide the gross income sought.
While certainly most all forms of ‘compensation’ (unless intentionally exempted/excluded) are taxable under gross income, the income tax itself is actually a tax upon net income and not gross income; and while corporations are considered as legal persons that are also permitted to deduct most all forms of theft, loss, and expense, however, at the same time it excludes private individuals from being permitted those same advantages (for the most part that is), therefore the income tax laws provide unconstitutional XIV Amendment protections to structured businesses, also called legal “persons”, but not to literal persons, further eroding its overall validity.
As to the contract issue, you are not being forthright, being that the worth of your labor is the exact worth entered into to by that contract; as some feel (e.g., for individual reasons, experience, education, pomp, etc.) their labor is valued more than others for the exact same performance of labor, while some employers feel that labor for a given work assignment should bear them less expense than when performed at other geographical locales or environments, etc., also factors such as COL fit into this equation as well. Otherwise nobody would ever have the capacity to seek out a claim of damages when such classes of contracts are breeched, because the employee would need to prove an element of their injury and would, thus, be incapable of doing so because the employer would simply argue that their loss actually had cost them nothing at all as their injury was merely perceived and nothing more.
Further proving your presumptions entirely incorrect:
In “Reflections on the Formation and Distribution of Wealth”  (authored by: Turgot): “6. The wages of the workman is limited by the competition among those who work for a subsistence. He only gains a livelihood.
The mere workman, who depends only on his lands and his industry, has nothing but such part of his labour as he is able to dispose of to others. He sells it at a cheaper or a dearer price; but this high or low price does not depend on himself alone; it results from the agreement he has made with the person who employs him. The latter pays him as little as he can help, and as he has the choice from among a great number of workmen, he prefers the person who works cheapest. The workmen are therefore obliged to lower their price in opposition to each other. In every species of labour it must, and, in effect, it does happen, that the wages of the workman is confined merely to what is necessary to procure him a subsistence.”
And in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915): “The principle is fundamental and vital. Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property -- partaking of the nature of each -- is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial impairment of liberty in the long established constitutional sense. The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich, for the vast majority of persons have no other honest way to begin to acquire property save by working for money.”
* Also see the Butcher's Union Co. case at: 111 U.S. 746, 757, 762 (1884).
Also to note that Dr. Adam Smith had made reference to a contracting principle between employers and employees as when directly taxing the ignoble, effectively explaining that when taxing an employer’s employees their standard of wages would need to be increased to that proportion so as to cover that incurred loss in their pay, thereby, ultimately resulting in a tax upon the employee but covered for by their employer.
QUOTING: “Second, even if it were to be so analyzed, there would still be gain because gain is the difference between what is received and the cost of what was given up (NOT the value of what was given up). Since one has no cost basis in his labor, the entire amount of compensation is income.”
No, again this is premise is entirely false. A gain does not necessarily involve a loss or expense, gains have more to do with fortuity than anything else -you’re thinking more of profits. A gain first requires the necessary investment capital to provide for the possibility to acquire a ‘gain’ and likely involves an element of risk, chance, or uncertainty, no such elements are involved in the process of common laboring as laboring is usually performed through contractual arrangements (save for when such is also actually your means of laboring as is the case for stock-runners; those playing the slots, bingo, or the lotto; commodity or real estate markets, for example). For profits, those involve an element of business as a mathematical computation, so as to profit is to acquire a financial increase less all related expense, loss, and cost. Neither are subordinate employees SB/SE as the IRS seems to like to mark the down as in their silly little computer program.
Also there are in fact personal costs assumed during the act of laboring just the same as in the running of a business, e.g., your personal wellbeing and stress, necessary education and training (including ongoing in some respects), travel to and from work, clothing and work related supplies or tools, union dues, contractual obligations such as: FICA, Obamacare, additional insurance coverage, etc.; permanent or ongoing bodily wear and tear, which could lead to ever-burdening medical bills and/or unpaid time away from work or loss of work; laboring usually results in additional food and beverage consumption; extended time away from one’s home and family, decreased enjoyment in personal life, or diminished family experiences; etc. Also there are a myriad of other related costs and hazards such as unending and costly vehicle maintenance, personal loss incurred from theft, vandalism, robbery, substance abuse, and other such misfortunes that affect the populace on a daily basis throughout America.
QUOTING: “Finally, note that if your second premise is correct, then even compensation from a governmentally-privileged activity wouldn’t be subject to the income tax, so that under your “analysis”, even Mr. Earl shouldn’t have been taxed. But he was, wasn’t he?”
No, this is just more of your blatant illogic at work –neither do I “waffle about whether the privilege must be federal or not”, see this is what you are failing to grasp, such privileged vocations, occupations, and employments are and have always been justified under the excise tax, as one does not have a right to be employed by the U.S. Military or to become an attorney or an ATF, NSA, IRS, FBI, or CIA agent, etc., as these (including the privilege of running a nationalized business or profiting nationally from resources extracted from land or sea) are all revocable privileges (created and dependant upon the federal government and nothing else), while on the other hand the federal government has absolutely zero authority to restrict the right of common laboring within any state of the Union at least for U.S. citizens (however, this would be limited to the confines of statehood sovereignty).
Additionally, you are further falling behind by failing to comprehend the significant distinction between being compensated for providing a privileged service and being paid as a means of ones livelihood. Although in either case if the former or the latter receives qualifying compensation then that is legally taxable -as this is not to be taken to mean the a menial laborer cannot receive various forms of compensation (that could be considered taxable) in addition to their normal standard of pay, such as is frequently the case for employees that are protected by bargaining groups.
Say what now? The Lucas case does make mention of him being an attorney, and had done so for a reason, but not of being an employee of any specific company, though if he was such an employee, I would surmise that he held a formal position there as an attorney, officer, chairman, board-member of that company, or some combination thereof, so don’t try and tell me that he worked there as wire-stripper & puller, electrical pole installer, lead-worker, truck driver, transformer refurber, or whatever.
Also have you even bothered to actually read that case, you seem to be making statements not based on anything that is true, i.e., “… could [Earl] be taxed for the whole of the salary and attorney's fees earned by him in the years 1920 and 1921 …”? This was the sole consideration with respects to his profession, not his entire work career as you had asserted.
The entirety of the Lucas’ case whopping three paragraphs provides nothing supportive of its conclusions levied therein; it is essentially just a two sentenced “opinion” so far as one can tell of a one Justice Holmes and nothing more. Other than that you seem to be reading way too much in the Lucas case, as I have already emphasized to you.
QUOTE: “There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earn them …” and “In other words, the rule is that compensation for work is taxable …”
Here, I merely note that, yet again, you wage inane and misleading arguments.
QUOTE: “The rationale of the case was that state employees are taxable on their compensation just the same as employees in the private sector.”
No, yea, I got that, it is a given, but what is the point of mentioning this though? Now is it just me or is this not just plain common sense? It is entirely obvious after all, I mean, sure, I could have rubbed it in your face by pointing out this all out to you; informing you that here is a case contradicting that stupid argument you have made in the past when you had attempted to explain why federal employees are specifically signaled out time and time again within all of the Subtitle C and F legalese terms -you know having stated something about how there was some confusion amongst federal employees that they held the impression that they were (for some unexplainable rational) entirely exempt from taxation merely because they were employed by the federal government or some hokey crap to that effect (as even if this were the case they felt that they had to revamp legislation exclusively for their own employees as opposed to just sending out a quick nationwide workforce memo and updating their employee indoctrination policies, like the W-4 they had to turn in during the hiring process and the W-2 they received at the close of each year were not clue enough for them each and all). How utterly ridiculous!
QUOTE: “Incidentally, your note of curiosity about the closing sentence of the case is curious only to someone who’s too dense to notice that it came from a dissenting opinion.”
Actually, I think it was two justices that dissented in that one, with the second being in full agreement to the first, but either way, you seem to have missed my point, which was that a justice not only dissented in that case, but had willfully displayed an intellectual understanding with regard to the federal income tax that you yourself seem to wholly lack.
Alright, so in closing, let’s get this straight, shalt we? You wholly dismiss the truly paramount cases, such as Pollock, Stratton’s, Brushaber, Stanton, Doyle, Southern Pacific, Eisner, Merchant’s, Smietanka, Bowers, Glenshaw Glass, South Carolina, etc., in strict favor of rather irrelevant cases such as Springer and Lucas? That being the case, here is a newsflash for you, there is a very, very good reason that other cases (including the Annotated Constitution) do not lend much weight in consideration or reference to those few cases you persistently quote or cite to (while conveniently ignoring those many others), being as they provide not any thorough insight or substance to the matter of federal income taxation, none at all.
You wrongfully opt to dismiss the core of the matter and instead argue solely in defense of the result (e.g., your employer (or someone) submitted a W-3/W-2 on you so now you owe whatever tax is thereupon stated that informational receipt, regardless if you actually received that money or not; the IRS has penalized you so therefore you must be have acted unlawfully, and consequently because of this you are not entitled to any form of due process being as the IRS has already spoken to your wrongfulness so in the wrong you must of been; there are not any tax cases where a person has gotten out of paying their “fair share”, so that in itself is plenty of evidence proving your fallacies; etc., etc.) As so stated in Eisner: “… it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is not "income," as the term is there used, and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form. …”
Other than that you are absolutely making your inferences without first having established a supporting basis to stand upon.